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Abstract—Large deployment of distribute energy resources and
the increasing awareness of end-users towards their energy pro-
curement are challenging current practices of electricity markets.
A change of paradigm, from a top-down hierarchical approach to
a more decentralized framework, has been recently researched,
with market structures relying on multi-bilateral trades among
market participants. In order to guarantee feasibility in power
system operation, it is crucial to rethink the interaction with
system operators and the way operational costs are shared in
such decentralized markets. We propose here to include system
operators, both at transmission and distribution level, as active
actors of the market, accounting for power grid constraints and
line losses. Moreover, to avoid market outcomes that discriminate
agents for their geographical location, we analyze loss allocation
policies and their impact on market outcomes and prices.
Index Terms—Peer-to-peer trading, Loss allocation, Optimal
power flow, Network charges.
NOMENCLATURE
Below the list of the most important symbols in alphabetical
order and grouped among sets, parameters, primal and dual
variables.
SETS:
C Set of nodes c where TSO and DSO are connected.
D Set of distribution nodes r, s.
I Set of market agents i.
In Set of market agents i connected to node n (or r).
L Set of all transmission and distribution lines.
LACn Set of AC lines k connected to node n.
LDCn Set of HVDC lines h connected to node n.
LTSO Set of lines at TSO level.
LDSO Set of lines at DSO level.
T Set of transmission nodes n.
Ωi Set of trading partners j for agent i.
PARAMETERS:
A Loss allocation matrix to agents.
b0 Line shunt susceptance.
B Line susceptance matrix.
D Loss distribution matrix (line to nodes).
F Active power limits of transmission lines.
G Line conductance matrix.
IDC Incidence matrix of HVDC lines.
K Agents’ capacity.
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M Linear coefficients of line losses.
N Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF) matrix.
P , P Agents’ max and min active power setpoints.
Q,Q Agents’ max and min reactive power setpoints.
Q Constant coefficient of line losses.
S Apparent power limits of distribution lines.
TF Modified version of the PTDF matrix.
V , V Maximum and minimum voltage magnitudes.
Θ,Θ Maximum and minimum voltage angles.
VARIABLES:
eT, eD Exchange between TSO and DSO.
fk Active power flow (line k).
f Pd Active power flow (line d).
f Qd Reactive power flow (line d).
pi Active power setpoint (agent i).
qi Reactive power setpoint (agent i).
tij Trade between agent i and j.
vr Voltage magnitude at bus r.
wl Line losses (line l or d).
wij Losses caused by the trade tij .
zij Net injection corresponding to the trade tij .
λr Reactive nodal price.
pii Perceived price (agent i).
θr Voltage angle at bus r.
τ E Price of exchange TSO-DSO.
τ Lij Loss price (trade ij).
τ Tij Trade price (trade ij).
τ Zij Grid price (trade ij).
I. INTRODUCTION
The fast development of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs) and the increasing flexibility of energy management
systems for residential homes and commercial buildings have
paved the way to new opportunities for energy end-users.
Thanks to the recent development of Information and Commu-
nication Technology (ICT) and in line with the ongoing evolu-
tion of the economy towards sharing systems [1], a shift from
centralized to decentralized electricity markets is expected
to happen. Scenarios of how these electricity markets will
take place have been proposed in [2], ranging from peer-to-
peer (P2P), community-based and microgrid structures. Multi-
lateral electricity trades were already proposed in [3], but only
recently a new branch of literature has started to address how
these markets would be designed and implemented in practice
[4]–[6]. However, the independent evolution of electricity
markets and power systems, operated by Transmission (TSO)
or Distribution (DSO) System Operators, raises concerns on
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2the ability of these new market proposals to coexist with
reliable power system management.
Pool-based electricity markets have the advantage to gather
all the information needed to find market equilibria within
one platform. Consequently, TSOs can interface directly with
the market operator to guarantee feasibility in power system
operation. This is usually done by accounting for power
flows during the market clearing, like in the case of the
American locational marginal pricing system, or by redispatch
actions, i.e., ex-post corrective actions, as it happens in Europe.
When conceiving future electricity markets that operate in
a decentralized manner, the challenges are to redefine the
current interactions with TSOs and to include DSOs in the
market mechanism, since most of end-users are connected to
the distribution level. Several solution methods to integrate
System Operators (SOs) in decentralized frameworks have
been proposed, mainly including two approaches: an iterative
process in which SOs accept or reject multi-lateral energy
trades depending on whether network constraints are violated
[7]–[9] and the usage of pre-defined network charges, e.g.,
based on the electrical distance between peers [10].
All the proposed solutions have two main limitations. First,
they do not account for a coordination between TSOs and
DSOs, a crucial challenge in modern power systems, as
analyzed in [11], [12]. Second, power losses occurring in
the network are often overlooked, since their procurement
costs are currently included in grid tariffs of end-users. In
this regard, the current literature presents several methods
for allocating losses among grid users at transmission or
distribution level, as pointed out in [13]. However, all these
methods are only suitable for the calculation of grid tariffs,
as they consist in ex-post calculations of the power flows
based on market outcomes. More recently, the authors of
[14] proposed a peer-to-peer electricity market accounting for
power losses, where network charges are dynamically adapted
to each trade based on its grid usage. However, no attention is
given to how loss allocation policies impact fairness of market
equilibria.
In this work, we argue that i) loss allocation policies directly
impact market outcomes and prices, and ii) many current
loss allocation policies result in an unfair distribution of
losses among market participants. This happens particularly at
distribution level, as shown in [13], [15]. Therefore, this paper
proposes to extend the decentralized energy market of [16]
to consider interactions between SOs and to include market
products for power losses. More specifically, the contributions
of this paper are:
• the extension of the unified market formulation of decen-
tralized electricity markets proposed in [16] to account
for the interactions with multiple TSOs and DSOs.
• the inclusion of additional market products not only to
enhance coordination among different SOs, but also to
dynamically compute network charges of each energy
trade.
• the extension of the models of system operators with loss
allocation policies and the investigation of their impact on
fairness of market outcomes.
Such framework allows to assess fairness of payments, which
is an important aspect not considered in the existing literature,
by analyzing the impact of different loss allocation policies
on market participants. Moreover, the obtained market archi-
tecture considers TSOs and DSOs as independent and active
agents in the market clearing, resulting in market equilibria
already accounting for power grid constraints, that we call
endogenous P2P electricity market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, the optimization models of each market actors are
presented and then combined into a single market clearing
formulation. Section III addresses the definition of different
loss allocation policies and their impact on energy trades
and prices in the form of network charges. A dedicated test
case and simulation results are then described in Section
IV. Finally, Section V gathers conclusions and perspectives
regarding further works.
II. MARKET CLEARING FORMULATION
We first lay down the optimization problems of each market
participant: namely, prosumers, system operators (both at
transmission and distribution level) and the market operator.
We then consider the market clearing as an equilibrium
problem, where all agents negotiate their energy procurement,
while maximizing their profits. Eventually, we will show that
this negotiation mechanism is a convex potential game, hence
there exists a Nash equilibrium that can be found by solving
the equivalent optimization problem.
Since the focus of this study is to assess the properties of the
proposed market design, we find the market equilibrium by di-
rectly solving the equivalent optimization problem. Distributed
optimization techniques could also be readily applied to clear
the market, as largely reviewed in [17]–[19]. In this way,
one would simulate an actual implementation of decentralized
electricity markets, where each agent individually optimizes
her energy procurement and exchange information with the
others to reach consensus.
A. Preliminaries and Notation
The scope of this study is to integrate SOs in the negotiation
process of decentralized electricity markets and to investigate
properties of the consequent market outcomes. We propose
a novel architecture for decentralized electricity markets, in
order to account for power grid constraints and power losses.
We do this by considering additional market products, on top
of traded energy tij between prosumer i and j, as displayed
in Figure 1. These new market products include: the energy
exchanged between SOs ec as well as the energy injection
zij and respective power losses wij corresponding to tij . This
allows for prosumers and SOs to operate as independent agents
in a decentralized electricity market without the need of any
information about any other market participant.
The scope of this work is to propose and analyze an
innovative market architecture for decentralized electricity
markets. We focus on how individual prosumers optimize
their energy procurement, while interacting with independent
3Prosumer 1
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Fig. 1. Decentralized electricity market architecture where energy including
grid constraints and power losses.
SOs. Therefore we leave the fundamental issues of real-
world implementations, power flow accuracy among all, as
future work. In particular, any more accurate power flow
model could be employed, as long as it maintains convexity
and separability, i.e. no shared information among market
agents. This justifies the need for the following assumptions.
Market actors are considered rational and truthful, thus no
strategic behaviour is taken into account. Any non-convexity
of their optimization problems is neglected or relaxed to
convex approximations, in particular the optimal power flow
equations of SOs. For clarity of notation, we present the
mathematical formulation of a market with one TSO and
one DSO, but the extension to multiple TSOs and DSOs
is straightforward: in fact, the numerical results presented
in Section IV consider multiple DSOs. We then restrict the
market clearing to a single instance: no ramping and time
coupling constraints are included in the model. Finally, we
assume a perfect communication system among market actors:
namely information is computed and exchanged synchronously
and without any delay. This guarantees that in case the market
is cleared in a decentralized fashion, the exact same market
equilibrium is attained.
In each formulation, we use lower and upper case symbols
respectively for variables and parameters, in bold if matrices
or vectors. Dual variables, which in an equilibrium problem
are decision variables of the market operator and parameters
for the other agents, are expressed with Greek letters. We use
i as index for market participants I, which can communicate
and trade with a set of trading partners j ∈ Ωi. Each agent is
connected to a bus of the power grid: for simplicity of notation
we distinguish between TSO nodes, indexed n ∈ T , and DSO
buses, r, s ∈ D. We identify the set of agents connected at bus
n (or r) by subscripting the set of agents In. Additionally, for
each bus at TSO level n we split the lines connected to it
in two sets, AC k ∈ LACn and HVDC h ∈ LDCn , while LTSO
is the set of all lines at TSO level. Lines at DSO level are
grouped in the set of the pairs of receiving and sending nodes
d = (r, s) ∈ LDSO. All the lines are then grouped in the set
L. Finally, we define a set of nodes c ∈ C, where DSOs and
TSOs are connected.
B. Prosumers
The objective of each prosumer i is to minimize their energy
procurement costs and can be modelled as an optimization
problem,
min
ΓP
fi(pi, qi)−
∑
j∈Ωi(τ
T
ij + τ
Z
ij)tij − (τ Zij + τ Lij)wij
− λr|i∈Ir qi
(1a)
s.t.
∑
j∈Ωi
(tij + wij) = pi : pii (1b)
P i ≤ pi ≤ P i : γPi , γPi (1c)
Q
i
≤ qi ≤ Qi : γQi , γ
Q
i (1d)
wij ≥ 0, tij ∈ R (1e)
where ΓP = {pi, qi, ti,wi} is the set of variables, with pi the
net active power of agent i (positive if generated and negative
if consumed) and qi the reactive power. The vector ti is the
collection of tij , i.e., the energy traded between agent i and
each of the j trading partners in Ωi at price τ Tij . As in [16],
by changing the communication topology among market par-
ticipants, one could simulate different market structures, from
pool-based to community-based and peer-to-peer markets.
Additionally, each trade impacts the power grid both in
term of congestions, reflected by the price charge τ Zij , and by
creating power losses. These losses wij , caused by the trade
between agents i and j, need to be procured at price τ Zij + τ
L
ij ,
i.e. grid plus loss price, with the respective system operator.
The sum of the trades balances out with the net generation
and the losses as in (1b) at a perceived price pii. P i and P i
are respectively the maximum and minimum active power set-
points while γ
i
and γi are the dual variables associated with
these limits. Respectively, (1d) bounds reactive power, whose
grid costs are enforced by means of the reactive nodal price
λr. The objective function (1a) is to minimize procurement
costs, as a sum of generation costs (and consumption utility),
energy and loss trades and grid costs.
C. Transmission System Operator
We formulate the optimization problem of the Transmission
System Operator (TSO) as
min
ΓT
∑
c∈C
τ Ec e
T
c +
∑
n∈T
∑
i∈In
τ Zijzij
+
∑
l∈LTSO
∑
i|In∈T
τ LijA(i,j),l wl
(2a)
s.t. fk =
∑
n∈T
Nkn
( ∑
i∈In
zij −
∑
h∈LDCn
IDCnh fh
−
∑
c∈Cn
eTc −
∑
l∈L
Dnl wl
)
∀k ∈ Lac : ϕk (2b)
− F l ≤ fl ≤ F l ∀l ∈ LTSO : µl, µl (2c)
4wl = M
T
l |fl|+QTl ∀l ∈ LTSO : φl (2d)
z, eT ∈ R, w ≥ 0 (2e)
where ΓT = {f ,w, z, eT} is the set of decision variables of
the TSO, with f the vector of line flows both in AC and DC,w
the vector of line losses and eT the vector of power exchanges
from TSO to DSOs. The vector z gathers all the injections
corresponding to each trade, including the associated losses.
The objective function (2a) represents the cost of the energy
exchanged with all DSOs at price τ Ec , the sum of the congestion
rent over AC and HVDC lines and the cost of losses. The
subset Cn is used to identify all the DSOs connected to node
n. On the one hand, the congestion rent is expressed as the sum
over all nodes of all injections zij times the respective grid
price τ Zij . On the other hand, the cost of losses is calculated
as the sum over the losses of each line l at price τ Lij .
Power flows over AC lines are derived using the Power
Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF) matrix, represented by
the elements Nkn ofN in (2b), and the nodal injection of each
trade, with ϕ being the respective dual variable. Nodal injec-
tions are calculated as the sum of the injections corresponding
to each energy trade, HVDC line flows, energy exchange with
DSOs and line losses. Line losses are transformed into nodal
losses by allocating half of the line losses to the respective
receiving and sending node, Dnl = 0.5 if node n is connected
line l and zero otherwise.
We define AC flows by means of the PTDF matrix and not
through voltage angle differences, in order to avoid multiple
dual solutions. In fact, in the B-theta formulation, power
flows are calculated as the difference of voltage angles: the
corresponding KKTs represent an undetermined system of
equations with infinite dual variable solutions. The flows over
HVDC lines are included in the nodal injections. Indeed,
thanks to the flexibility of HVDC lines, those flows can be
arbitrarily defined by the TSO and are modeled as positive
or negative injections. We include HVDC lines in our TSO
model since their ability to control power flows makes such
components even more relevant in view of a future electricity
market where power losses are included as a market product.
Constraint (2c) defines the line limits, with F l being the
capacities of the lines, and µ
l
and µl the respective dual
variables, in other words the shadow prices of congestion.
In order to define the losses allocated to each trade, we
first model line losses wl as a linear function of the line
flows fl, constraint (2d). Loss functions are included in the
form of two inequality constraints as in [20]; in this way it is
possible to properly calculate losses without considering the
direction of the flow (that would require the introduction of
binary variables). The coefficients of the linear approximation
are computed using the least squares method as in [20],
where the authors propose an extension to piece-wise linear
approximation that is added to this model for the test case
analysis. Line losses are then allocated to market participants,
connected at TSO i|In ∈ T , by means of allocation policies,
modelled as coefficients of the matrix A. By doing this,
we propose loss allocation policies that directly affect the
negotiation mechanism of decentralized electricity markets,
instead of being allocated ex-post. We will deeper investigate
different policies and their impact on market equilibria in the
following sections.
D. Distribution System Operator
A distribution system operator participates to the negotiation
mechanism with objectives similar to a TSO. Given the lower
voltage level, we extend the power flow equations to include
reactive power, resulting in:
min
ΓD
∑
r∈D
∑
s∈Dr
λr f
Q
(r,s) − τ Ec eDc +
∑
r∈D
∑
i∈Ir
τ Zijzij
+
∑
d∈LDSO
∑
i|Ir∈D
τ LijA(i,j),d wd
(3a)
s.t. f Pd = Brs(ϑr − ϑs)−Grs(vr − vs)
∀d : (r, s) ∈ LDSO : ϕPd (3b)
f Qd = B
∗
rs(vr − vs) +Grs(ϑr − ϑs)− b0rs
∀d : (r, s) ∈ LDSO : ϕQd (3c)
(f Pd)
2 + (f Qd )
2 ≤ (Sd)2 ∀d ∈ LDSO : ηACd (3d)∑
i,j∈Ir
zij =
∑
d:(r,s)∈Ir
f Pd +
∑
d∈LDSO
Drdwd +
∑
c∈Cr
eDc
∀r ∈ D : ηr (3e)
eDc = −
∑
r∈D
∑
i∈Ir
zij +
∑
d∈LDSO
wd : η
E
c (3f)
ϑref = 0 (3g)
Θr ≤ ϑr ≤ Θr ∀r ∈ D : ηθr, ηθr (3h)
V r ≤ vr ≤ V r ∀r ∈ D : ηVr, ηVr (3i)
wd = M
D
d |f Pd |+QDd ∀d ∈ LDSO : φd (3j)
f P,f Q, z, eT ∈ R, w ≥ 0 (3k)
with ΓD = {f P,f Q, z,w, eD,ϑ,v} is the set of decision
variables of the DSO, with f P and f Q respectively the line
active and reactive flows, z the injections corresponding to
agent trades and losses, w the line losses, eD the energy flow
from DSO to TSO and ϑ,v respectively the voltage angles
and magnitudes. As already presented for the TSO model, the
objective function (3a) represents the sum of the congestion
rent (both for active and reactive flows), the costs of trades
with the TSO and the cost of losses. The losses are traded
between market participants, at distribution level i|Ir ∈ D,
and the DSO, who enforces loss allocation policies similarly
to the TSO problem, summarized with the matrix A, further
discussed in the following section.
The active and reactive power flows are derived through
constraints (3b) and (3c) using a linear approximation of an AC
power flow [21], where b0rs is the shunt susceptance, Grs the
conductance and Brs the susceptance of line between d nodes
r and s (B∗rs = Brs+2b
0
rs), with ϕ
P
d and ϕ
Q
d the associated dual
variables. Line capacities are enforced by the conic constraint
(3d), while nodal balances are guaranteed by (3e).
Similarly to the formulation of the TSO problem, power
losses in the distribution grid are calculated for each line
through constraint (3j), by means of a linear approximation.
The energy flow between TSO and DSO is calculated as the
sum of all the trades originated at DSO level and the losses on
5all DSO lines, as in constraint (3f). The case of one connection
node is presented above only for simplicity of indexing and
notation, however several connection points can be readily
considered. Finally, constraints (3i) and (3h) ensure voltage
standard compliance at each node r, with V r, V r, Θr and Θr
being the maximum deviation of magnitudes and angles, and
ηV
r
, ηVr, η
θ
r
and ηθr the corresponding dual variables.
E. Market Operator
The market constraints ensure trade reciprocity of energy
and losses, as well the allocation policies for losses and power
balances at TSO and DSO level. The respective optimization
problem becomes
min
ΓM
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ωi
[
− (tij + tji)τ Tij − (tij + wij − zij)τ Zij
−
(
wij −
∑
l∈L
A(i,j),l wl τ
L
ij
)
τ Lij
]
+
∑
c∈C
(eTc − eDc )τ Ec
+
∑
r∈D
∑
s∈Dr
(f Q(r,s) −
∑
i∈Ir
qi)λr (4a)
s.t. τ T, τ Z, τ E, τ L,λ ∈ R (4b)
where ΓM = {τ T, τ Z, τ E, τ L,λ} is the set of decision variables
of the market operator, indicating respectively the prices of
the energy trades among market participants, of grid usage
for each injection caused by the energy trades, of energy
exchange between TSO and DSOs, of losses and the nodal
prices for reactive power. The objective function of the market
operator (4a) is to enforce shared constraints by setting all the
mentioned prices.
F. Equivalent Optimization Problem
The optimization problems of all market players are convex
problems, as long as the cost or utility function fi of each
prosumer i is convex. Note that a usual formulation of a
DC power flow via the PTDF matrix involves employing the
sum of agent injections pi in constraint (2b). This, however,
results in a generalized Nash equilibrium, since prosumer
actions limit the feasible space of the TSO. By introducing the
additional variables z, no variable of a market player appears
in the constraints of other agents, refining the generalized
Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium. It is straightforward
to show that the Jacobian of the game map is symmetric,
hence the game map is integrable (Theorem 1.3.1 in [22]).
Therefore, a Nash equilibrium exists and we can write the
following equivalent optimization problem,
min
ΓP,ΓT,ΓD
∑
i∈I
fi(pi, qi) (5a)
s.t. (1b)− (1e) (5b)
(2b)− (2e) (5c)
(3b)− (3k) (5d)
tij = −tji ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ Ωi : τ Tij (5e)
tij + wij = zij ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ Ωi : τ Zij (5f)
wij =
∑
l∈L
A(i,j),l wl ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ Ωi : τ Lij (5g)
eTc = e
D
c ∀c ∈ C : τ Ec (5h)∑
s∈Dr
f Qrs −
∑
i∈Ir
qi = 0 ∀r ∈ D : λQr (5i)
where the objective function and constraint (5b) include the
optimization problems of all prosumers, and constraints (5c)
and (5d) describe the problems of respectively the TSO and
the DSO. All these agent based problems are linked by
constraints (5e)-(5i), corresponding to the objective functions
of all market agents, where such constraints were relaxed in
their Lagrangian form.
Note that (5) can be solved by means of decomposition
techniques, such as the Alternating Direction Method of Mul-
tipliers (ADMM). This decentralized negotiation mechanism
would read as an extension of the ADMM algorithm in [16],
with (5e) - (5i) the respective complicating constraints.
III. LOSS ALLOCATION POLICIES
When including losses in decentralized electricity markets,
fairness of agent payments may be undermined. To verify this,
we analyze the price formation mechanism and the consequent
effect of different loss allocation policies.
A. Price Formation
Trade prices, for both energy and losses, can be extracted
as dual variables of (5e) - (5i) or can be analytically derived
by computing the first-order conditions of (5). We hereby
presents only the most meaningful among all these equations
to understand the impact of grid constraints and losses on trade
prices. These are
pi :
∂fi
∂pi
− pii + γPi − γPi = 0 (6a)
tij : pii − τ Tij − τ Zij = 0 (6b)
wij : pii − τ Zij − τ Lij = 0 (6c)
zij : τ
Z
ij −
∑
k∈L
Nkn|n∈In∪C ϕk = 0 (6d)
wl :
∑
i∈I
A(i,j),l τ
L
i + φl +
∑
k∈L
Nkn Dnl ϕk = 0 (6e)
From (6a), we can identify pii as the price perceived by agent
i, driving her dispatch decision, limited by asset capacities.
From (6b) and (6c), it follows that the perceived price equals
each trade price τ Tij , or equivalently the loss price τ
L
ij , adjusted
by τ Zij , including the impact of all grid constraints on the mar-
ket equilibrium as in (6d) (it is intuitive that a price difference
happens only if some of these constraints are binding). This
implies that energy and losses are traded at the same grid-
aware price. Therefore, the allocation policies, summarized by
A(i,j),l, do not only impact the definition of the loss price of
each trade, as in (6e), but also the energy price of each trade.
Hence, loss allocation policies should be carefully designed
in order to grant fairness of market participation. Since the
concept of fairness can differ among system operators, we
propose two policies, that can be independently employed by
different SOs or even combined to obtain a milder strategy.
6B. Loss Allocation Policies
We summarize the allocation policy coefficients in a matrix
A with 2T rows, with T the number of trades (we define a
coefficient for the trade (i, j) and one for the trade (j, i)) and
with L columns, with L the number of lines. We propose
two different allocation policies: one where each System
Operator (SO) socializes the losses in its lines (ASOC) and one
reflecting grid usage of individual trades (AIND). We define
the socialization policy coefficients as
ASOC(i,j),l =

1
2T SO if i ∈ ISO, l ∈ LSO
0 otherwise
(7)
with T SO the number of trades of the SO, that agent i belongs
to. Each agent is equally allocated the losses occurring on the
lines of the respective SO. This policy erases geographical
discrimination of market participants, but at the same time
trades are not affected by their individual impact on the grid.
The second proposed policy attains the opposite effect. By
allocating to each trade the losses produced by the flows
it generates, this policy discriminates agents based on their
geographical location. The coefficients of this policy are
defined as
AIND(i,j),l =
|TFln|i∈In − TFlm|j∈Im |∑
i,j∈I
|TFln|i∈In − TFlm|j∈Im |
(8)
where TFln|i∈In is a modified version of the PTDF matrix for
line l and node n where agent i is connected. The PTDF matrix
is modified to include DSO nodes and lines. This is done by
defining the PTDF matrix for each block of nodes and lines
of each SO. Then each node at DSO has the same values for
the TSO lines as the node of connection between TSO and
DSO. To compute the allocation policy coefficients for trade
(i, j), we employ the difference of the modified PTDF at the
respective nodes in absolute value, to avoid negative values
while accounting for grid usage at the same time. Finally, the
values are normalized to guarantee that all the coefficients for
each line sum to 1.
Ideally, this individual allocation policy should account
for the amount of energy traded, to allocate more losses to
larger trades and vice-versa. However, this would make appear
bilinear terms in the optimization problem of the SOs, which is
highly non-practical. Therefore, we propose to account for the
size of the market agents, by adjusting the allocation policy
coefficients by the agent capacities (Ki). The policy in (8)
then becomes
AIND(i,j),l =
|TFln|i∈In − TFlm|j∈Im |∑
i,j∈I
|TFln|i∈In − TFlm|j∈Im |
Ki∑
i∈I
Ki
(9)
where
Ki = max
{|P i|, |P i|} (10)
Arguments for fairness and unfairness of both policies exist.
On the one hand, a socialization policy equally distributes total
loss costs across market participants without discrimination
on geographical location. At the same time, agents are not
incentivized to trade locally, as they are charged the same no
matter the distance with their trading partners. On the other
hand, an individual policy makes sure that each agent pays for
the losses she causes in the system, incentivizing local trading.
However, this policy may discriminate, for instance, one agent
at the end of a DSO feeder that gets allocated the losses of all
the lines to reach the feeder, compared to a market participant
close to the connection with the TSO. Therefore, we propose
a linear combination of the two strategies,
A(i,j),l = χ A
SOC
(i,j),l + (1− χ) AIND(i,j),l (11)
with χ a socialization factor, to find a trade-off between the
advantages and caveats of both policies. One should notice that
different SOs can have different allocation policies. In fact in
the following section, we investigate a test case with both TSO
and DSOs over different combination of allocation policies to
show how they impact market outcomes and payments.
C. Illustrative Example
We hereby propose a small test case to provide in-depth
insight on the impacts of different loss allocation policies. We
consider a 5 bus system, including both a meshed (TSO) and a
radial (DSO) network, with only one generator and three loads,
as pictured in Figure 2. On the one hand, a consumption unit
(agent 2) belongs to the TSO grid and is connected to the
generator by long lines. On the other hand, agents 3 and 4 are
connected at DSO level, respectively close to and far from the
feeder.
We simulate this illustrative example with 3 different loss
allocation policies: socialization (χ = 1), individual (χ = 0
w/out K) and individual scaled by capacities (χ = 0 w/ K).
We then investigate the impact of different policies in terms of
payment increase in absolute (∆Ci) and percentage (∆%Ci)
values,
∆Ci = Ci − C0i (12)
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Fig. 2. Illustrative 5-bus test case, with a TSO and a DSO.
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Fig. 3. Increase of payments in absolute (left) and percentage (right) values.
7∆%Ci =
Ci − C0i
|C0i |
(13)
with Ci =
∑
j∈ωi tij (τ
T
ij + τ
Z
ij) the payments of agent i. We
use the superscript 0 to identify the reference case, where
losses are not considered while clearing the market.
Figure 3 shows that the socialization policy achieves an
equal split of losses across market participants. One should
note that the revenues of the generator (agent 1) increase,
since, in this small case, it is the only generator, hence the
marginal one providing the extra power to compensate for the
losses that are not considered in the reference case. However,
when looking at the results for the same policy in percentage
terms, it is clear that the smaller agents (3 and 4) are strongly
discriminated. On the other hand, the individual policy allo-
cates larger payments to agents 2 and 4, corresponding to the
units further away from the generator. In percentage terms,
however, agent 3 is still discriminated over agent 2 because
of her size. When including the capacity proportionality to
the individual allocation policy, the payments become more
uniform across agents in percentage terms. As for the actual
payments, they also decrease in magnitude as the marginal
generator, having a larger capacity than the others, gets more
losses allocated reducing the need for the loads to procure
power.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section evaluates the impact of grid constraints and
the performance of the different loss allocation policies on a
test case, including a TSO network with several connected
DSOs. First, the test case is described. Then, the numerical
results are investigated to compare market equilibria with and
without grid constraints, followed by an analysis on the impact
of different loss allocation policies on market outcomes and
prices.
A. Test Case Description
We simulate our market formulation on a modified RTS ‘96
IEEE test system presented in [23]. Not being the focus of this
paper, the overall synchronicity of the test case is guaranteed
by replacing the HVDC line between nodes 123 and 323 by
an AC line of the same capacity. To match the formulation
of this paper, wind farms are considered as prosumers such
that P i and P i are equal to the power production. Focusing
on the analysis of the proposed loss allocation policies, the
results presented in this paper are obtained for a single time
step, September 2nd of the original dataset.
Moreover, 12 IEEE 33-bus distribution network1 connected
to transmission nodes 111, 112, 120, 211, 214, 303, 311, 312,
411, 412 and 414 to complete the test case. For the sake of
clarity of the results, agents of each distribution networks
are gathered in energy communities. However it is worth
mentioning that such market structure is only one of the
possible ones, as thoroughly discussed in [16]. DSO agents are
considered as prosumers with lower bound of their power asset
1Line capacities of the distribution systems are based on https://portfolio.
du.edu/downloadItem/358246
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Fig. 4. Line loading at TSO (left) and DSO (right) level.
P corresponding to the power demand of the IEEE 33-bus
distribution network (with a change of the sign convention),
while their upper bounds P are computed by randomly
sampling the difference P − P from a uniform distribution
U(0, 1). Similarly, cost curves are sampled uniformly between
10 and 50 e/MWh. The final test case as well as the code used
to run the simulations are available on GitLab2. Not being the
focus of this paper, simulation results are obtained by solving
(5) as a centralized optimization problem. We refer to [24]
for further analyses on the computation and communication
properties of P2P electricity market solved in a decentralized
manner.
B. Impact of Grid Constraints
We first investigate the impact of power flow constraints on
the feasibility of market outcomes, by simulating the market
clearing (5) with and without including grid constraints. This
analysis highlights the advantage of the endogenous P2P
market proposed here compared to an exogenous approach
2https://gitlab.com/fmoret/p2p loss
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Fig. 7. Price percentage increase as function of the weighted electrical
distance. Trend lines (dashed) are calculated without considering outliers.
such as in [10]. Power losses and their allocation policies are
not yet considered, to only analyze the effect of the network on
the market equilibrium. The results of our simulations verify
that all power grid variables respect their limits, once included
in the model. For instance, Figure 4 shows the loading of
transmission and distribution lines for a market clearing with
and without grid constraints. The results clearly show violation
of line capacities for both system operators, if grid constraints
are not included in the negotiation process, in particular at
DSO level where reactive flows contribute to the overload
of lines. Optimizing energy trades while accounting for grid
feasibility become fundamental in view of an even lager
penetration of DERs, causing considerable reversed (from
DSO to TSO) and reactive power flows. By including grid
constraints in the market clearing, system operators will reduce
the need for grid reinforcement and reactive compensation
measures.
From (6), we extracted how grid constraints modify trade
prices to account for power flow feasibility, e.g., line and
voltage limits. Similarly to a market based on locational
marginal pricing, one line congestion impacts the price of
each bus. Note that agents connected at the same bus trade at
the same price if no economic preference is included. Figure
5 displays the percentage increase, compared to the market
clearing without grid constraints, of the price of agents at
each TSO bus. For clarity of representation, DSOs (represented
with a squared marker) are grouped at their connection node
to the TSO grid. The width of the connecting edges is
plotted proportionally to the line flows, with congested lines
highlighted in red. The average price per agent decreases from
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15.6 e/MWh (the uniform price of the market clearing without
grid constraints) to 14.5 e/MWh. However, larger prices,
with a peak of 20.4 e/MWh, appear as a consequence of
congested lines. Visually, it appears that prices are distributed
in high and low price zones: in fact, including grid constraints
in the market clearing provides incentives to locally match
generation and consumption.
To this extent, Figure 6 shows how the average trading
distance of TSO prosumers is largely reduced both in terms
of its mean and standard deviation. DSO agents are not
considered, since, in this specific market architecture, they
only trade with the respective community manager located at
the feeder, hence their distance is not impacted. We calculate
the average trading distance δi of each agent i as the PTDF-
based electric distance between two trading agents weighted
by the energy traded. It follows
δi =
∑
j∈Ωi
∑
l∈L |PTDFli − PTDFlj | rl tij∑
j∈Ωi tij
(14)
with rl the resistance of each line l. As investigated in [24],
the number of trades of each market participant increases
the complexity of the market clearing problem, especially if
solved by means of distributed optimization techniques. The
natural effect of the power grid to incentivize local trades
presented here could be employed to increase the sparsity of
the communication matrix among agents.
C. Impact of Loss Allocation Policies
After investigating the impact of grid constraints on market
outcomes, we focus our analysis on the different loss allocation
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Fig. 9. Price percentage increase as function of the total amount of trades.
Trend lines (dashed) are calculated without considering outliers
policies proposed. We first compare the effects of a social-
ization (7) and an individual (8) policy. Figure 7 displays the
percentage increase of payments as a function of the weighted
electrical distance, defined in (14), of both TSO and DSO
agents. We use the socialization policy as a reference, where
each trade is allocated an equal share of the respective SO
losses, and plot the cost increase when an individual policy is
employed. It is clear that market participants that engage in
distant trades are penalized by larger losses, and consequently
payments. This trend is stronger at DSO rather than at TSO
level, since agents at the end of a radial grid are naturally
further away from the feeder, while it is attenuated in a meshed
grid where power flows through several parallel paths.
This can be clearly seen from Figure 8, where losses and
electrical distance are displayed for a sample of the simulated
agents. While a socialization policy leads to equal losses across
all SO agents, an individual policy induces large disparity at
DSO level as function of their electrical distance from the
feeder. On the other hand, market participants at TSO level
are indeed impacted by their trading electrical distance, but
the variation is limited thanks to the meshed layout of the
power grid. Therefore, we argue that a socialization policy
is preferred at DSO level to avoid discriminating agents for
their unintentional geographical location, while at TSO level
an individual policy can still be used, charging more for trades
with higher grid usage, but without creating unfairly large
payment differences.
As pointed out in Section III, an ideal individual policy
should use the actual amount of trades to quantify losses, but
this would introduce bilinear terms, mining the convexity of
the overall problem. We propose to consider the capacity of
market participants as a proxy of their trades. Figure 9 shows
the impact of considering agent capacities in an individual
allocation policy, as in (9), by displaying the percentage
payments increase (with the socialization policy as a reference)
as function of the overall energy traded by each agent. The
clear linear trend obtained when including agent capacities in
the allocation policy is evidence that we can approximate the
objective of allocating more losses to agents that trade more
energy, while keeping the optimization problem convex.
V. CONCLUSION
In view of decentralized electricity markets, the role of
system operators is fundamental to guarantee feasibility in
power system operation. In this work, we tackled the coor-
dination of system operators with agents participating in peer-
to-peer electricity markets and with other system operators,
both at transmission and distribution level. We showed that by
including system operators in the negotiation process grid con-
straints are respected and trade prices are affected by network
charges. These additional tariffs are dynamically calculated as
an outcome of the negotiation mechanism, reflecting the actual
grid usage of each trade and providing incentives to local
match of generation and consumption. We then included power
losses as an additional market product that system operators
trade for compensating transmission and distribution costs.
We finally argued that loss allocation policies are needed to
guarantee fairness among market participants, that could be
discriminated for their geographical location otherwise.
Including system operator in the negotiation mechanism,
based on decomposition techniques for large optimization
problems, drastically increases the complexity of the algo-
rithm. Even if it is still possible to find the optimal consensus
among all these market actors, the time needed to attain it
might increase to the point of making such mechanism not
suitable for real life implementations. Therefore, this work
should be considered as an ideal benchmark for the design
of decentralized electricity markets. For instance, it could
be used for exploring new opportunities for a decentralized
management of the power systems, as well as for better
defining ex-ante network charges that approximate the results
proposed in this work. Finally, further research should aim
for designing negotiation processes with guaranteed trade-
off between optimality of market equilibria and algorithmic
complexity. Computationally lighter mechanisms may lead to
market inefficiency, but this might be the price to pay for real-
life implementation of such complex market mechanisms.
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